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BRIEF OF APPELLANT. CLUFF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The trial court, upon remand, erred in 
failing to apply to the property occupied by the Halladays. 
but within the title description of Mrs. Cluff, the rule of 
law announced by this Court on the first appeal. 
2. The trial court, in the order entered on 
remand, erred in holding that "all other claims raised by the 
defendants against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53.243 have 
been decided and are res judicata. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Halladays to guiet 
title to a parcel of property within the legal description of 
Halladays1 title which had been occupied by the defendants. 
Cluff and Bigelow, for in excess of 30 years. Mrs. Cluff 
counterclaimed, claiming ownership on the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence to a portion of the property to which the 
Halladays' were seeking to quiet title. Mrs. Cluff pleaded in 
her Counterclaim alternatively that if boundary by acquies-
cence did not apply, Mrs. Cluff should be entitled to property 
lying to the west of her fence line and within her title line, 
but to which the Halladays had possession for a number of 
years. 
The trial court ruled that boundary by acquiescence 
had been established and quieted title to property shown on 
Appendix "A" crosshatched in orange and noted by the designa-
tions "MNOP" to Cluff and Bigelow and awarded the greenhatched 
strip of property designated as "WXYZ" to Halladay. Both 
rulings were consistent with the holdings in Fuoco v. 
Williams. 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 998 (1964) and Hales v. 
Frakes. Utah, 600 P.2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1979). 
Halladays appealed and this Court reversed the trial 
court, in Halladay v. Cluff, et al, 685 P.Rptr.2d 500 (1984). 
The case was "remanded to the district court for the entry of 
a new decree in conformity with" the opinion rendered in the 
matter. 
In reversing, this Court held that a fifth element 
for boundary by acquiescence was not present to sustain the 
lower court's decision, that being the element of a dispute or 
uncertainty over the questioned area. 
Upon remand, counsel for defendant. Cluff, requested 
a hearing before the trial court, presented Mrs. Cluff1s 
contention that the same rule of law should apply to the 
green-hatched area on Appendix "A" and marked with point 
designations "WXYZ" as applied to the crosshatched area in 
orange and marked with the point designations MNOP. The trial 
court declined granting Mrs, Cluf^s request to quiet title to 
the area within her title line. i.e. green shaded area on 
Appendix "A", marked WXYZ. but beyond the fence line. 
From the trial court's ruling upon said remand hear-
ing. Mrs. Cluff has filed this appeal. 
Because this is the second appeal of this matter, the 
transcript of the trial contains three numbering series at the 
bottom right hand corner of the transcript. The typed number 
beginning with page 1 was the assigned number the court re-
porter gave to the transcript at the time that the transcript 
was typed. The stamped on number on the same page in the file 
transcript commencing with the number 102 was the number given 
in the record filed with the Supreme Court on the first appeal 
of this matter. The stamped on number on the same page in the 
file transcript commencing with the number 40 is the number 
system applied by the County Clerk on this second appeal. The 
most recent stamping will be the numbers referred to in this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the commencement of this case, the 
defendant, Cluff, had occupied property within an old estab-
lished fence line for over 30 years. (R. 153:18-26; 
155:12-21). The testimony of the plaintiffs' witness, Elmo 
Halladay, testified that the fence line had been placed in 
prior to 1930 and that the fence line was a continuous un-
broken fence line in U shape, going from the front of the 1st 
South Street back some 231 feet, then across the back the 
width of the Cluff and Bigelow properties, then returning 
South to the street. (R. 99:3-24). The plaintiffs had occu-
pied the portion of the property lying within the defendant, 
Cluff's title line, but lying west of the old fence, a strip 
approximately 10 feet wide by the length of her property. (R. 
100:28-30; 101:1-9). Mrs. Cluff had occupied the area cross-
hatched in orange in the Appendix "A" attached hereto for the 
same period of time (Elmo Halladay, R. 106:6-13; 118:11-17). 
At the time of the commencement of the suit, the 
defendant, Cluff, filed a Counterclaim alleging that the 
property crosshatched in orange had become her property and 
that of Bigelow by boundary by acquiescence and acknowledging 
on the same factual basis the property shown in green was the 
property of the plaintiffs by boundary by acquiescence. 
(R. ). The defendant, Cluff, however, pleaded in 
the alternative that if the trial court determined that there 
was not a boundary by acquiescence and that the title lines 
were to govern that the trial court should award to Cluff the 
property west of her fence but within her title line shown in 
green on Appendix "A" and that the property crosshatched in 
orange should be awarded to Halladay based upon title lines. 
(R. ). 
One distinguishing factual circumstance was that the 
title line of Halladays did not connect to the title line of 
Cluff, but that there was a no man's land between the title 
line of Halladays and the title line of Cluff demonstrated by 
plaintiffs witness, the engineer Clyde Naylor. (R. 75:27-30; 
76:1). 
In the opening statements to the court in the trial 
of this matter which was tried without a jury, Cluff1s counsel 
emphasised that pursuant to the Counterclaim, if the court 
should conclude that the crosshatched area marked in orange 
was to be awarded to Cluff applying the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence, then the green shaded area should go to 
Halladays on the same doctrine. But if the court should rule 
that title lines governed, then the green area should go to 
Cluff and the orange area should go to Halladays (R. 52:21-30, 
53:1-14; 56:1-20) . 
At the time the Halladays moved into the area in 
approximately 1930, the fence line shown on Appendix "A" and 
marked by points Y to X to M, running north and south, thence 
easterly to point N. then south to point O and back to 100 
South Street was in place. The title line of the Cluff pro-
perty as testified to by Clyde Naylor. Halladays' engineer 
witness encompassed the green shaded area, points WXYZ. There 
was a gap which is shown on Appendix "A" as shaded blue lying 
just to the west of the Cluff title line. (R. 75:27-30; 
76:1). The testimony of Elmo Halladay. Mack Halladay and 
Madge Cluff all indicate that the area to the west of the old 
fence and lying within the Cluff title line had been occupied 
by the Halladays for many years. Likewise, the area encom-
passed in orange Crosshatch, that portion of MNOP lying to the 
north of the Cluff property, has been occupied by the Cluffs 
for the same period of years. (R. 106:6-13; 118:11-17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this action the litigants came to the litigation 
with a history wherein Halladays had occupied for a number of 
years a pacel of property within the title line of Cluff and 
shaded in green on Appendix "A". Thus Halladay was occupying 
property beyond his titled description. Madge Cluff was 
occupying property within the old fence line, but which 
reached beyond her title line. 
The conditions for application of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence applied to both parcels as then 
understood by the litigants with the exception that there was 
a no man's land between the title line of the west side of 
Cluff's property and the east side of Halladay's property. 
When this Court ruled on the first appeal of this matter that 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiesence required an uncer-
tainty or dispute as to the boundary line as an additional 
element, this Court narrowed the circumstances under which the 
doctrine could be applied. 
It is Madge Cluff*s contention that the ruling re-
quiring this fifth element of a boundary by acquiesence re-
quires the application of that doctrine equally and fairly to 
both parcels previously occupied by the litigants Halladay and 
Cluff. Madge Cluff argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to apply the doctrine appropriately to the two parcels. 
On remand, the trial court reasoned that since Madge 
Cluff had not filed an appeal from the Court's earlier ruling 
giving Halladays the green shaded area by boundary by acquies-
cence, that the only matter before the trial court on remand 
was to deal with the specific parcel crosshatched in orange 
for which Halladays had filed the appeal. Madge Cluff further 
argues that to expect her to anticipate that the Court might 
reverse the trial court on appeal and thus file a cross appeal 
as to that principle and doctrine upon which she had been 
successful in the trial court is unreasonable. It is ludi-
crous to expect a party who has won a lawsuit to file a cross 
appeal from that winning ruling and thus clutter the Supreme 
Court with the additional volume of work created by the cross 
appeal. 
Madge Cluff further argues that the order presented 
to Judge Ballif for signing does not comport with the ruling 
Judge Ballif gave at the time of rehearing and includes an 
additional paragraph pertaining to res judicata which was not 
before the Court by pleadings or encompassed within his ruling 
to the parties, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING MRS. CLUFF THE 
GREEN SHADED AREA MARKED BY POINTS WXYZ ON APPENDIX 
"A" 
In Madge Cluff*s Counterclaim, she first alleged and 
claimed to have acquired that portion of the property lying to 
the north of her legal title, but lying within the old fenced 
area under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Pleading in the alternative in her Counterclaim, 
Madge Cluff alleged that the property shaded green and marked 
by points WXYZ on Appendix "A" was within the description of 
her legal title but outside the old fence line. Madge Cluff 
alleged that if the court ruled that boundary by acquiescence 
was not applicable to Madge Cluff's acquisition of the orange 
crosshatched area, the area shaded green and marked by points 
WXYZ was beyond the old fence line, but within Madge Cluff s 
title line and asserted that the same doctrine should be 
applied to parcel MNOP as is applied to WXYZ. 
In counsel's opening statement to the court (R. 52) 
wherein Madge Cluff's counsel stated to the court: 
We think that the rule of law and the 
factual circumstances are identical on the 
green slashed area as on the orange slashed 
area except to the party who is in posses-
sion. (R. 52:21-24). 
In the evidence presented to the court, it was shown 
that Halladays had been in possession of the green slashed 
area for a number of years and Mrs. Cluff had been in posses-
sion of that portion of the orange slashed area contiguous to 
her title line for the same period of time. This writer went 
on to inform the court of that possession (R. 56) wherein he 
What I am saying, when I said that the same 
principle lies, if the court is going to 
follow title lines rather than boundary by 
acquiescence then we would be entitled to 
the green slashed area and we believe that 
if Mr. Halladay is entitled to the orange 
slashed area to his title line, that we are 
entitled to move over to the title line. 
There should be a consistency. (R. 56:1-7) 
THE COURT: . . . [B]ut as far as the fence 
line is concerned here, you don't claim to 
the west of it, right Mr. Jeffs? 
That's true, we think it became there by 
boundary by acquiescence, the same as we 
claim the other piece. But, if the court 
were to adopt the rule that there was no 
boundary by acquiescence, and you are going 
to examine the title, then I think we will 
be entitled to that title. (R. 56:8-20). 
The one distinguishing factor between the claim of 
boundary by acquiescence of the Halladays to the green shaded 
area that marks it different than the orange slashed area is 
that between the title line of the Cluff property lying on the 
west or left hand side of the green shaded area and the east 
boundary line of the title of Halladay in parcel 5, there was 
a gap marked on Appendix "A" in blue. Halladays' first wit-
ness was Lynn Gottfredson who. in cross examination, was asked 
to identify that gap of title area. Mr. Gottfredson said: 
Q: When you did this survey. Mr. Gottfred-
son, you show the Cluff property bounded on 
the west by a fence in place, do you not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that fence is within the title line 
of the Cluff property, is it not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you also show on this survey the 
property that lies immediately to the 
west# shown on Exhibit A and marked as 
Parcel No. 5 and as the Halladay property? 
A: Yes. I do. 
Q: Does this exhibit show that the title 
line of the Halladay property has a gap 
between that title line and the title line 
of the Cluff property? 
A: Yes. (R. 65:5-19). 
The land surveyor. Clyde Naylor. also testified to 
the lack of the parcel 5 of the Halladay property being conti-
guous to the Cluff property where in cross examination. Mr. 
Naylor stated: 
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Q. In preparing your tracings. Exhibits 8 
and 12. did you also discover that the 
Halladay title line or parcel 5 between 
that and the Cluff title line at parcel 3, 
leaves an area that is not within either 
party's legal description. 
A. Yes. (R. 75:27-30; 76:1) 
In the testimony of Elmo Halladay. the older brother 
to plaintiff. Mack Halladay. he was asked regarding the fence 
running between X and Y an Exhibit 8 and 12 and the lack of a 
dispute between the parties. Upon questioning by counsel for 
Mack Halladay, the following testimony was given: 
Q: Now I direct your attention to a dif-
ferent part of the drawing. I direct your 
attention to a line between the point X and 
Y on Exhibit 8. There appears to be a 
fence line there, is that right? 
A: Right. (R. 99:28-30; 100:1-2) 
Q: Now what was the purpose of this old 
fence that runs between point X and point Y 
on Exhibit 8. 
A: That divided the property between our 
place and I think. Brother Durnell, who 
owned it at that time. That was Madge's 
(Cluff) father. 
Q: Are you aware of any conflict regarding 
that fence line. 
A: None at all. (R. 100:28-30; 101:1-2. 
7-9) 
Mack Halladay testified: 
THE COURT: For the record, can you indi-
cate which property line he is referring to? 
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Q (By Mr. Young): Are you referring to the 
fence line--
A: The old fence line. yes. 
Q: between points X and Y. 
A: Yes, uh-huh. 
Q: Have you talked to Mrs. Cluff about 
this property or had any problems relating 
to this fence line?. 
A: No. I have never had any problems with 
her. We never had any question over it. 
Q: Now what was your attitude toward the 
fence line. 
A: That was the property line. (R. 
118:4-17) 
Q: You indicated that you never, ever had 
a controversy with Madge Cluff over the M 
to Y fence line. 
A: No I have never had any arguments over 
the fence line. (R. 142:14-17) 
Applying the principle announced by this Court in 
Halladay v. Cluff. et al. supra.. this Court ruled that in 
addition to the four elements pronounced in Fuoco v. Williams. 
supra. . and Hales v. Frakes. supra. . and set forth in the 
Conclusions of Law signed by Judge Ballif in the first pro-
ceeding (R. 7:4-10). the Court added a fifth requirement of 
uncertainty or dispute as an ingredient in boundary by ac-
quiescence. 
The record above quoted demonstrates by the testimony 
of Mack Halladay himself as well as his older brother. Elmo 
Halladay, that there had never been a dispute or problems 
connected with the fence line running between points X and Y. 
Thus, under the principle as now pronounced by the Court, the 
Halladays' claim to boundary by acquiescence to the green 
shaded area fails because of not meeting the requirement that 
it must be contiguous to the adjoining land owner's property 
by reason of the gap in the title between the title line of 
Halladay and the green shaded area. It now also fails because 
of their testimony that there was no dispute over that area at 
any time, precluding a determination that the fifth element of 
boundary of acquiescence was met. 
In this matter, Madge Cluff advanced two alternate 
theories. First, if the title lines are controlling, she 
would be entitled to the green shaded area and Mack Halladay 
would be entitled to the orange slashed area. The alternative 
theory was that if boundary by acquiescence applied, it ap-
plied to confer title upon Madge Cluff to the orange shaded 
area and to Mack Halladay on the green shaded area. Her 
primary position was that the application of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence was supported in the facts. 
When the trial court ruled on the matter. Judge 
Ballif found that boundary by acquiescence applied to both the 
green shaded area inurring to the benefit of Mack Halladay and 
the orange shaded area inurring to the benefit of Madge 
Cluff. This was following the mandate in the decision in 
Fuoco v. Williams, supra. , and Hales v. Frake. supra. 
Having had the Court rule favorably on the primary 
theory advanced by Madge Cluff. it would be inconsistent and 
ludicrous to expect that Madge Cluff would file a cross-appeal 
challenging the Court's ruling as to the green shaded area. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, when the matter was 
reversed and the elements for boundary by acguiescence were 
redefined, this Court stated at page 508: "The decree is 
reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court for 
entry of a new decree in conformity with this opinion." 
Upon the further hearing and arguments in the case, 
(R. 234-253) the trial court declined to apply the rule of law 
announced in Halladay v. Cluff, et a L t supra., to the green 
shaded area, WXYZ on appendix "A", despite the fact that the 
trial transcript showed that there had been no dispute over 
the boundary line and that the title line controlled. 
The Court further indicated that because no cross-
appeal had been made by Madge Cluff challenging the ruling of 
the trial court, regarding the green shaded area that that 
issue was not before the Court on remand. The trial court 
reasoned that since Madge Cluff had not filed an appeal on the 
issue of boundary by acquiescence on the green shaded area, 
the Court could not grant in the new decree title to the green 
shaded area to Mrs. Cluff based on the title lines. It is ob-
vious that the trial court in the first decree entered having 
accepted Madge Cluff's primary theory and applied boundary by 
acquiescence to both parcels, Madge Cluff would not file an 
appeal from a decision she had won. 
On remand, this Court having declared that boundary 
by acquiescence was not applicable because of a lack of dis-
pute over the boundary line, to apply said rule only as to 
parcel marked ABCD and not to apply the title line to the 
green shaded area produces a very inequitable result. Halla-
day thus acquires the property marked MNOP under his title and 
acquires the green shaded area under the now discredited 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
In reversing the decision of the trial judge and 
instructing Judge Ballif to enter a decree in conformity with 
the opinion, ruling that the now pronounced elements of boun-
dary by acquiescence had not been met, that provision of the 
decree applying to the green shaded area should have received 
the same treatment and application of rules as those pro-
nounced by the court in regard to the orange area. 
Following the decision in Halladay v. Cluff, et al., 
supra., handed down on May 1, 1984, the Court again had before 
it the issue of a claim of boundary by acquiescence almost 
identical with the case in Halladay v. Cluff, supra. In 
Hottinger & Dastrup v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (1984), the 
circumstances were an occupation for a number of years up to a 
fence line that reached beyond the title line of the party 
occupying the disputed area. The opinion notes that though 
the parties both argued boundary by acquiescence, the trial 
court had decided on equitable grounds that it would be in-
equitable to dislodge the occupier of the land that reached 
beyond their title. That condition of inequitability per-
meates the case now before the Court and which was initially 
before the Court in the May, 1984 ruling. The Court made no 
mention in Hottinqer of its ruling in Halladay v. Cluff. 
Just 40 days later, the Court addressed the issue 
again in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1984), 
affirming its position taken as to the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence and previously announced in Halladay v. Cluff. 
That decision was handed down on August 30, 1984, and the 
following day, on August 31, 1984, in Parsons v. Anderson, 690 
P.2d 535 (Utah, 1984), the Court reaffirmed its position in 
Halladay v. Cluff. 
This writer asks the Court to recognize and apply the 
now announced principle for the determination of the require-
ments for establishment of a boundary by acquiescence consis-
tently in the case now before the Court and hold that Mrs. 
Cluff, appellant herein, is entitled to have the title quieted 
in her on the green shaded area encompassed in her title line. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL OTHER 
CLAIMS RAISED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS AGAINST THE PLAIN-
TIFFS IN CIVIL NO. 53243 HAVE BEEN DECIDED AND ARE 
RES JUDICATA 
Following the decision rendered by this Court in 
Halladay v. Cluff, supra. , the file was returned to the Utah 
County Clerk pursuant to the remittur (R. 12). Following the 
remittur. counsel for Madge Cluff requested a hearing on the 
issue of the decree to be rendered pursuant to that remittur. 
(R 25-26) 
The matter came before the court on the 21st day of 
September, 1984 and arguments were presented by counsel for 
the various parties (Reporters transcript; R. 234-253). No 
other pleadings were filed with the court following the re-
mittur. On the 27th day of September, 1984, Judge Ballif 
sitting for the Fourth District Court entered his ruling on 
the entry of the order pursuant to the remittur and the remand 
for entry of modified decree (R. 27-28). 
In the ruling of Judge Ballif, he directed counsel 
for Halladays to prepare a new decree guieting title in the 
Halladays as to parcel 3 using the description circumscribed 
by points ABCD (R. 28). 
In the order submitted by Halladays' counsel and 
signed by the court on October 18, 1984 (R. 29-30), counsel 
for Halladays inserted a paragraph 2 "that all other claims 
raised by defendants as against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 
53243 have been decided and are res judicata." That volunteer 
paragraph is unsupported by pleadings in the file or in the 
record and are a voluntary addition of counsel. Said order 
entered was not in conformity to the instructions on remand, 
nor supported by pleadings, and this Court should now rule 
that paragraph 2 of the order dated October 15, 1984 (R. 
29-30) should be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Madge Cluff. asks this Court to remand 
this proceeding with directions to the trial court to enter a 
decree quieting title in Madge Cluff to the green shaded area 
lying within her title line and shown by points WXYZ on Ap-
pendix "A" attached hereto. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of March, 1985. 
M. Dayle J^Tfs / / / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that ten copies of the foregoing 
were mailed to the Utah Supreme Court. State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114, and four copies were mailed to 
the below named parties in the United State Mails, postage 
prepaid, this 1st day of March. 1985. at the following ad-
dresses : 
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Attorneys for Defendants Bigelow 
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Provo, Utah 84601 
Brent D. Young. Esquire 
Ivie & Young 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
48 North University Avenue 
P. O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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APPENDIX "A" 
\m SEP 28 PH 3* 26 
WILLIAM F.r.mSh.CLFRK 
JK (1 ^nLPHv 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and Civil No. 53243 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . R U L I N G 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
BIGELOW and NORMA G. 
BIGELOW, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the 21st day of September, 
1984, wherein the Court heard oral argument from counsel as to the dis-
position to be made of this case on remand from the Supreme Court, and 
all of counsel were heard and the Court having thoroughly .the alterna-
tives, and the language of the Supreme Court directing that they 
" . . . reverse with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the 
record owners." 
It is noted that the defendants Halladay appealed from the Court's 
Ruling as to that portion of Defendants1 Exhibit 12 identified as "A", 
"B", "C", "D" or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal was taken as to the 
Court's finding of boundary by acquiescence as to Tracts 1 and 2 in 
Addendum 1 
Bigelow and Cluff respectively. Therefore, the only matter before the 
Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3 and that the same be quieted in 
the record owners. The Court therefore directs counsel for Halladays 
to prepare a new Decree quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 
along the description contained from points "A" to^B" to "C" to "D" . 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah, this /.'"[ day of September, 
1984. 
GEOR^ r.. BALLIF, JUD< 
m\ C:T !P y 2 ^ 
u
' :y . 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IV1E & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 53,243 
Defendants, 
This matter came before the court on the 21st day of September, 
1984, wherein the court heard oral argument from counsel as to 
the disposition to be made of this case on remand from the 
Supreme Court, and all of counsel were heard and the court having 
thoroughly considered the alternatives, and the language of the 
Supreme Court directing that they " . . . reverse with directions 
to quiet title in the Halladays, the record owners." 
It is noted that the plaintiffs Halladay appealed from the 
court's ruling as to that portion of defendant's Exhibit 12 
identified as "A", "B", "C", "D" or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal 
was taken as to the court's finding of boundary by acquiescence 
as to Tracts 1 and 2 in Bigelow and Cluff respectively. Therefore, 
the only matter before the Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3 
and that the same be quieted in the record owners. The court 
Addendum 2 
therefore directs counsel for Halladays to prepare a new decree 
quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 along the des-
cription contained from points "'A" to "B" to "C" to "D". 
Based upon the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That title to the following described property is 
is quieted in plaintiffs, Mack Halladay and Merle Halladay: 
Commencing 488.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North 
from the Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
thence West 118.10 feet, thence North 0° 03f 17" 
East along a fence line 55.31 feet, thence South 89° 
511 20" East along a fence line 118.20 feet thence 
South 0° 09f 25" West along a fence line, 55.01 feet 
to the point of beginning. Area .15 acres. 
2. That all other claims raised by the defendants as 
against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and 
are res judicata. 
Dated: October /9f , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
GEDRGE E. jBALL' I f , Judges 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of October, 1984 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foreqoing Order to S. Rex 
Lewis, Attorney for Defendants Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, 
Attorney for Defendant Cluff, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
S. REX LEWIS 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneyat Law 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorney at Law 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
BRENT D. YOUNG J 
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